TY - JOUR

T1 - Non-supernaturalism

T2 - Linguistic Convention, Metaphysical Claim, or Empirical Matter of Fact?

AU - Jaksland, Rasmus

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020, The Author(s).

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - This paper examines our pre-theoretic conception of non-supernaturalism; the thesis that all that exists is natural. It is argued that we intuitively take this thesis to be a substantive, non-dogmatic, empirically justified, not merely contingent truth. However, devicing an interpretation of non-supernaturalism that captures all aspects of this intuition is difficult. Indeed, it is found that this intuition conflates the strong inferential scope of a metaphysical claim with the modest justificatory requirements of an empirical matter of fact. As such, non-supernaturalism, in its pre-theoretic form, contains an internal tension that must be navigated whenever the thesis features in systematic thinking.

AB - This paper examines our pre-theoretic conception of non-supernaturalism; the thesis that all that exists is natural. It is argued that we intuitively take this thesis to be a substantive, non-dogmatic, empirically justified, not merely contingent truth. However, devicing an interpretation of non-supernaturalism that captures all aspects of this intuition is difficult. Indeed, it is found that this intuition conflates the strong inferential scope of a metaphysical claim with the modest justificatory requirements of an empirical matter of fact. As such, non-supernaturalism, in its pre-theoretic form, contains an internal tension that must be navigated whenever the thesis features in systematic thinking.

KW - Intuitions

KW - Metaphysics

KW - Methodology

KW - Naturalism

KW - Ontology

KW - Supernaturalism

U2 - 10.1007/s11406-020-00251-0

DO - 10.1007/s11406-020-00251-0

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85089733605

VL - 49

SP - 299

EP - 314

JO - Philosophia (United States)

JF - Philosophia (United States)

SN - 0048-3893

IS - 1

ER -