What Scientific Theories Could Not Be

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Standard

What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. / Halvorson, Hans.

I: Philosophy of Science, Bind 79, Nr. 2, 2012, s. 183-206.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Halvorson, H 2012, 'What Scientific Theories Could Not Be', Philosophy of Science, bind 79, nr. 2, s. 183-206. https://doi.org/10.1086/664745

APA

Halvorson, H. (2012). What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Science, 79(2), 183-206. https://doi.org/10.1086/664745

Vancouver

Halvorson H. What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Science. 2012;79(2):183-206. https://doi.org/10.1086/664745

Author

Halvorson, Hans. / What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. I: Philosophy of Science. 2012 ; Bind 79, Nr. 2. s. 183-206.

Bibtex

@article{67cc3a6502b74d349c84b09389b41e19,
title = "What Scientific Theories Could Not Be",
abstract = "According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view—if taken literally—leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view—as currently formulated—threatens to undermine scientific structuralism.",
author = "Hans Halvorson",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1086/664745",
language = "English",
volume = "79",
pages = "183--206",
journal = "Philosophy of Science",
issn = "0031-8248",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - What Scientific Theories Could Not Be

AU - Halvorson, Hans

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view—if taken literally—leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view—as currently formulated—threatens to undermine scientific structuralism.

AB - According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view—if taken literally—leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view—as currently formulated—threatens to undermine scientific structuralism.

U2 - 10.1086/664745

DO - 10.1086/664745

M3 - Journal article

VL - 79

SP - 183

EP - 206

JO - Philosophy of Science

JF - Philosophy of Science

SN - 0031-8248

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 289118232